Speaker 1 0:01
Okay, let's let's begin Good afternoon from Los Angeles. It's 1pm here in California. Whoever is watching or listening online, welcome. This is a series of panels organized by the International Institute at the University of California Los Angeles about the impact and implications of covid 19 on different regions of the world. My name is Kevin Harris. I'm a professor in the Department of Sociology at UCLA, and I teach in the National Institute. I'm joined here by my colleague, Doug Waxman, who is a political scientist and the head of the Nazarian center Israeli studies at UCLA, and we're joined by an illustrious panel to discuss the geopolitical implications of covid 19 for the Middle East. This this panel is sponsored by the Center for nation studies, The Nazarian center for Israeli studies, the Center for Middle Eastern development, the Berkel center for national relations, and here at the UCLA International Institute, I'd like to introduce our panelists. We're very excited for this conversation. There's going to be a Q and A so if you're watching online, feel free to send questions to our moderators, and your question can possibly be delivered to one or all of the speakers in our Q and A section, our three speakers today need a small introduction, but their accomplishments are illustrious, so I'm going to be brief introduction so we can get into the discussion for today. First we have Ambassador Hashem Youssef, who was a career diplomat with the initiative foreign affairs in Egypt. He's held positions at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and currently he's a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace. We also are happy to welcome Dalia dasak K who's director of the Center for Middle East public policy and a political scientist here in California at the RAND Corporation. And finally, Ehud Iran, who is a senior lecturer of international relations at the University of Haifa, and he's currently a visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. The order of the speakers who have asked to speak for about 10 minutes on the geopolitical implications of covid 19 for the Middle East and broader region, are going to be Hashem Yusuf and then Dahlia k then Ehud, Iran. So Ambassador Youssef, would you like to begin please?
Speaker 2 2:38
Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to join this panel. Thank you for the invitation. Let me start by saying that the pandemic resulted in global disruptions that have their reflections in the Middle East. I will try to draw a global picture in 12 points in Twitter format, then address the Middle East implication in that context. First, we witnessed a crisis in international cooperation with countries prohibiting exports and using illegal measures and in some cases arm twisting to steal medical shipments. Second, there was a dismal performance by international and regional institutions. Until today, we do not have a global strategy, and we don't even have regional strategies to deal with the pandemic. Third, the crisis gave ammunition to those arguing for bringing supply chains home, an empty globalization move, arguing for resilience at the expense of economic efficiency for national security purposes. Fourth, peacekeeping is facing a huge challenge, with global traveling come to a whole, coming to a halt, and of course, we can't resolve conflicts through zoom. Fifth, the global economy is devastated, and this may lead to social unrest and revolts six, I think, because of movement constraints, our life would be significantly shaped, shaped in cyberspace, and we will it is yet to be seen, what the young generation will think about that they were forced to seclusion, and they may shape the new Corona world in cyberspace, or perhaps have a contrarian appreciation for communal life we'll see. Seventh, the future of mass protests will be in jeopardy. Eighth, I think people realize that Government Performance matters because government mistakes cost lives and plenty of lives. Ninth, I think there was also a dismal performance in crisis management, providing accurate information, countering misinformation and even conspiracy theories, which were rampant. 10th, I think also. So the pandemic resulted in societal tensions, as those who stayed home were angry because they felt that those who are leaving the rooms put them in danger, regardless of why they were leaving their homes. And then 11th, I think the pandemic provided an excuse for some governments to expand intrusive surveillance under the guise of tracing contacts of those who are infected. And finally, we thought that we had a pretty good command on science to relieve us of much of our suffering. And of course, we were definitely wrong. So the pandemic has shaken the foundations of our existence, and this is not a temporary interruption of the norm. I think we need to come to terms with the new world that is in the making. And if the pandemic had caused huge challenges in the most advanced countries, you can only imagine the kind of havoc it entails on the Middle East that has been witnessing devastating conflicts, massive displacement, erosion of governance capacity, social cohesion and so on. But if I come to the middle east, I will address very briefly four points, conflict dynamics, healthcare systems, democracy and change and the economic challenges. If we go to the conflict dynamics, there were those who were questioning when the pandemic started, whether political efforts would be mobilized to resolve or at least stabilize some of the protected conflicts. And I think it's obvious today that this did not happen and probably will not happen. It's interesting that, for example, in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the Palestinians were in the dilemma between the necessity of cooperation, which took place, but in order to save life, and the political realities of annexation plan that was forcing them to move towards ending cooperation with Israel. In Yemen, we haven't we haven't seen any real progress on the ground. In Libya, we saw the situation even getting much worse with the situation changing on the ground, with savage taking back many areas from hefter in Syria, political process has its ups and downs, mostly downs, but no real progress ISIS has increased attacks in Iraq and Syria. On the positive side, you know, the we have witnessed that Iraqi prime minister was chosen after the long delay and there is, there is marginally reduced Iranian activity in Iraq. We also have seen a reduction in escalation between the United States and Iran, although this will probably be revived, one revived soon, when they start discussing in the Security Council the possible extension of an arms embargo. So so, you know, the situation is is rather difficult, but all these conflicts resulted in a humanitarian situation that has a staggering cost. In Syria, half the half the population was forcibly displaced, and we have the worst humanitarian situation in the world in Yemen, in addition to humanitarian catastrophes in many other places in the region. But the general sentiment in many of these conflict areas is that, well, we can die from the virus, but probably that death will come first, either from the conflict, from hunger, or from other sicknesses as well. So so they have also been suffering, but they have all kinds of problems, and they feel that the virus is not the biggest problem that they have. And of course, it's impossible to contemplate social distancing in huge, overcrowded and insanity refugee camps. Of course, humanitarian situations is extremely difficult in conflict zones in the best of times now, and add to that, the coronavirus and disruptions in supplies, shipping interruptions, travel restrictions, decision making, delays and so on. It made the situation very difficult for all those who are suffering individually. On the positive side, we show some Gulf countries providing assistance to Iran a gesture to demonstrate political intent, to use the crisis to ease regional tensions. We saw the UAE becoming the second largest aid donor in the world and so on. But still, we have our problems cut out for us, and I think radicalization would be under on the rise, and the conflict may become also more difficult in terms of how the conflicting parties will deal with all kinds of requirements pertaining to the pandemic. But the key point is that the developments pertaining to conflict. They were driven by the conflict dynamics, and they were not influenced in any fundamental manner by the pandemic. If we go to the healthcare systems, I think also it is, you know, as we have seen in in the countries that have the most robust healthcare systems, they were suffering from all kinds of difficulties. So the Middle East, of course, had these difficulties multiplied, but it also reminded people in different places around the world, particularly in developing countries, that even if you are from the protected elite in society, you must worry about the health of those neglected populations, because at the end of the day, the overall health in society depends on the health of its poorest people. And if a second wave of infections is inevitable, as economies open up, according to experts, and perhaps also a third wave may be coming by next fall, then many developing countries, including in the Middle East, are probably already late in preparing for this eventuality, if I go to democracy and change, and I think this is crucial for the future of the region, because the region has witnessed a first wave of revolutions in the last decade, and you know, as a result of all kinds of demands coming from, from from the people, for all kinds of drivers. But then after that, as a result of the, you know, governments not responding, we saw a second wave that had Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq and so on, and the grievances haven't been addressed and over and above. Now it has become even more difficult, with public health concerns added to the list of these public grievances. But in addition to the lockdown, governments in the region intensified efforts to control the mindset through punishing those who are spreading information about the pandemic that contradicts the messages coming from from the government, and there is clear evidence that some countries are preventing protests using the excuse of the fear of the spread of the virus. And of course, some governments are using surveillance tools to track those infected, but all these technology tools can be abused to track protesters and opposition, and of course, state measures would be much more intrusive. So so it is. It is a problem in relation to how, how things would develop. In relation to this issue, governments,
Speaker 2 12:39
you know, are struggling with the difficult challenges of suppressing the virus, the virus, and reviving the economy. And it is recognized that the economy, that the economic situation globally, will suffer hugely from from the pandemic. The IMF consider it a crisis like no other because of its depth and because the whole world is suffering. The World Bank expects that half a billion people will be added to those who are destitute. The World Food Program thinks that there are 260, 5 million people that would be pushed to the brink of starvation. So the cost is huge, and in the Middle East, also, the Gulf countries have been suffering because of the price of oil. Countries dependent depending on tourism, like Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco and so on, have seen zero traffic. Of course, the Gulf also will have to send many workers home, so this will affect workers remittances. But also there is an impact on trade, investment, travel, industries and so on. So it is, it is problematic. And of course, the debates on reopening the economies are very difficult because it is, it is very difficult to to have reconciling approaches between politicians, physicians and economists. So it is quite difficult. So you know, in the meantime, also, the millions of jobs over the Middle East will be will be lost as a result of the race. Let me conclude by by indicating that countries will be facing a choice in relation to both their internal policies and their external policies. And internally, they will either benefit from the crisis and deal with the shortcomings in a more democratic, democratic and rules based, based approach, or they will move towards curtailing freedom of expression and pursue a path of authoritarianism. Externally, they have to take into account that the global system will be weakened, and will either they will either adapt adopt an inward, isolationist policy, or one based on genuine international cooperation. And they will ask the question, can we find global solutions to global problems, or are we going to take a different route? And I think in the Middle East, I hope that the pandemic will have convinced people by now that the main challenge is good governance, not whether you're Sunni or Shia, secular UCLA, Islam. Thank
Speaker 1 15:16
you. Thank you, Ambassador. Excellent. Excellent point. So I'd like to turn over to Dr K and let's hear her remarks.
Speaker 3 15:24
Okay, well, thank you so much to UCLA for hosting this, as often occurs in these types of panels, when you have such an excellent first speaker, I really feel like I have very little to add ambassador. I couldn't agree more, especially with your last sentiment about the need for good governance and and leadership understanding a better way forward. Unfortunately, I don't think we're there today. What I'll do is I'll focus on what I think are my basic premise at this point. And I do want to caveat this by saying that we're we're very early into this crisis when we're talking about geopolitical impacts, it will take years to really understand the full magnitude of such a transformational crisis as we're living in today. So I just want to preface my comments with that. But at this stage, I would say that short of governments collapsing, which is possible, because this pandemic is coming at a time of already intense fragility across this region and governments across this region. I My main thesis is that I think the pandemic is largely accelerating and exacerbating existing trend lines. So what I'll do is I'll outline a few of those key trend lines. There are many. I think I'll put ISRAEL PALESTINE on the side, since Ehud speaking after me. So I'll let you, you speak to that. I'll have thoughts on that, but we'll let you speak to that. And I'll focus on some of the other region wide trends, which are largely negative. And I will be arguing this crisis is unfortunately only making them worse. And I'll just conclude with, I think maybe a couple areas of openings or potential shifts in in the geopolitical balance that may be resulting because of this pandemic. So starting with with some of the key trends. And I'll start with us Iran, which is the space I watch most closely. And here I might disagree a little bit with the ambassador. Unfortunately, I think that while there was hope and and this would have been theoretically a brilliant time for a political opening to de escalate this crisis. There was a lot of talk about given how hard hit Iran was. Of course, they themselves botched their response to this, but the Iranian people are suffering considerably from this crisis. The Iran was the epicenter outside of East Asia at the outset of this crisis. So there was talk about a humanitarian ceasefire, humanitarian gestures, ease the sanctions, let up on escalation, try to kind of reset, obviously not a rapprochement between the US and Iran, but at least a pause we unfortunately, there's also the sense that, because of the constraints on both sides at home, with such a so many domestic pressures to deal with that, that would also lower the temperature and the incentive to continue escalating. Unfortunately, though, I don't think this political opportunity has been seized, and I actually would argue that, you know, putting rhetoric aside, although the rhetoric is still pretty strong on both sides, even if you look at actual developments on the ground over the last few months, we're actually seeing, in my view, a continued escalation of this crisis. We are just saw continued rocket attacks against from Iranian backed militia forces in Iraq in mid March that killed two US personnel. We see Iran continuing to expand its the push the limits on its nuclear program, following, of course, the US unilateral withdrawal from that agreement. We've seen cyber attacks on Israeli water facilities, a counter cyber attack from the Israelis military satellite launch last month. The US, for its part, is threatening, even though it's not in the nuclear agreement anymore, this kind of convoluted argument that it's in the deal so it can snap back sanctions and continue the UN arms embargo. Just today, we saw the US announce that it will stop the waivers for international cooperation to stop the Non Proliferation efforts occurring in Iran. I could go on and on, but to me, this is not an environment of de escalation since early January, when the US and Iran engaged in the first direct military conflict in the very long and torturous relationship our two countries have. So I would make the argument sadly, that not only is the escalation not over, but the pandemic may only incentivize both sides to double down on escalatory policies, even if the intent is not to have all out war. And I've seen many. The analyzes, very convincing analyzes that neither side wants war. They can't afford it domestically, et cetera, et cetera. But yet, actions on the ground are leading us down this path, you could argue, and there are some we're continuing to see reporting of the debates in the Trump administration, but those who are pushing for continuation of maximum pressure, a more hawkish position, continually gaining the upper ground, despite the lack of strategic results from this policy, we are not seeing a better behaved Iran. We're not seeing a better nuclear deal. But yet, the focus is on continued pressure and and I think there's a sense that you know, Iran may be it facing this pandemic, on top of protests we saw last fall, at top of the economic catastrophe the country's facing, and, of course, the oil price plunge we there. There are some who can been emboldened, the emboldened and feel Iran is on the ropes. This is time for the knockout punch, either to bring them back to a better deal, or maybe it will lead to regime collapse. But there are, I think, case, there's a case to be made that the pandemic could lead to a confidence in the current strategy that will just encourage further escalatory actions. The Iranians, for their part, could be viewing the situation in a similar way, in the sense that they may feel, well, the US is more constrained now in terms of responding to our provocations, and that, because there's US elections coming up, there's other priorities domestically. The US is facing this. This pandemic is hitting the US very hard, that the US is less likely, the Trump administration is less likely to want to retaliate in any significant way. So my concern in some is that the
Speaker 3 21:48
potential of both sides being overconfident could lead to continued escalation and even renewed conflict, even if both sides didn't intend it. So that's the strategic trend line, the first strategic trend line that will actually touch every corner of the region that I'm watching most closely, that I think this pandemic has actually made worse, potentially. I hope I'm wrong, but that's my assessment at this stage. The second trend line that I'm looking at, that I think many of us are looking at, are is the growing influence of Russian and Chinese involvement in the region. I'm less focused on Russia. Russia is a more opportunistic actor. Faces its own constraints in the region, but China. China has a long term strategy in the Middle East. It's developing through the Belt and Road Initiative, extensive network, largely economic investment, but it's a long term plan to stay in this region. They are most dependent on the region in terms of oil, and I don't necessarily think it's a bad thing. I'm not in the camp that says yes or no, good or bad. We could use some burden sharing. It all depends what they do with that influence, but it is a trend line to watch. And what's interesting is that the Chinese have really capitalized on covid and this pandemic to build even further relationships and deepen relationships with countries in the region. You saw early on ship a shipment of 250,000 mass to Iran, for example, in late April, China signed a deal with Saudi Arabia for the purchase of Chinese test kits and medical expertise. It's really an interesting PR coup, given how much China itself watched this their response to the pandemic, and try to hide it at the at the outset, but they kind of turned it around, and now it presented themselves that the trusted global power that can handle this kind of public health crisis better, certainly than the United States. So that's how they're presenting it. I don't know how long lasting that will be, but just looking at GDP and kind of hard numbers alone, China is in the region for the long haul, and I think this pandemic has done nothing to reverse it, and most likely has accelerated. It the third trend line, which very much tracks with some of what the ambassador said, which is one of the most worrying trend lines in the region, which is the continuation of entrenched authoritarianism and repression. Again, this is a unfortunately, trend lines that have been ongoing, particularly brutal after the counter revolutions from the Arab uprisings over this past decade, there's continued unrest across the region, societal, societal divisions, inequity, corruption. It's not just about unemployment, although that's a huge pressure. I've seen some predictions that that this pandemic, combined with these previous pressures, could lead countries like Jordan to face up to 70% unemployment, youth unemployment, huge pressures on these countries. It's it's not a coincidence that this is a region that is ripe for breeding grounds for extremist groups and. Unfortunately we saw with the rise of ISIS and concerns about that returning. So in this environment, unfortunately we have authoritarian leaders in in many places, and even in those in kind of partial or semi partial democracies, you know, really kind of going to the traditional playbook the ambassador, I think, spelled it out well, you know, using the crisis, the public health crisis, as the cover to crack down on legitimate political opposition. And that's a really worrying trend line, especially when they're resorting to the surveillance tactics that are, you know, are good, good tactics to have in a public health crisis in terms of tracing and so forth, but the but those tactics combined with the strong role we're seeing in the military playing in many of these countries, particularly because of such weak state institutions those could outlast this pandemic. And that's a very worrying trend line for anyone that would like to see forget about the democracy word. But just for anyone would like to see better governance and accountability in this region, extremely, extremely concerning. The last one I will point to, in terms of trend lines, again, the ambassador touched on it, which is the humanitarian catastrophes before the pandemic, largely man made catastrophes caused by these horrific civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen in particular, and that has produced the some of the most daunting humanitarian crises that we have seen. The region has the biggest displacement crisis since World War Two globally, so far. And I you know we shouldn't hold our breath right now in countries that are most war torn, Syria Yemen, the numbers of covid are particular, are relatively low. But you know, the worst may be yet to come in the Middle East, and as the ambassador laid out, the region is completely unprepared to deal with public health crisis of this magnitude in terms of health infrastructure capability and so forth. And the refugee issue and a displaced person issue is particularly concerning given that refugees live in these crowded conditions, both within camps and the city areas or encampments, and are more likely to have pre existing conditions because they didn't have previous access to adequate health care. So right now, it has not multiplied the already daunting crisis, but that, I think, is a huge concern that that covid is going to only exacerbate those, those difficult conflict conditions. And unfortunately, I would agree with the ambassador that the underlying incentives to continue these conflicts are still in place. Unfortunately, in many of these, in these places, we can get more into that in Q and A, I want to just conclude with a couple. I don't know if I want to say bright spots, they may be short lived, but areas where, where things may be shifting a little bit, and here I want to make it clear that it's not just because of the pandemic. I think a lot of this is also because we have a perfect storm of and they're related, of course, but the pandemic, which with the oil crisis and the drastic drop in oil revenue and demand that combined with this public health crisis, could have transformational effects in this region, the one area where, the first area where I think it's a potential opening, and this is an area where I think this was happening anyway, even before the pandemic, is this potential for de escalation between the Arab Gulf and Iran, between the GCC Gulf Cooperation Council States and Iran you already saw the United Arab Emirates even before the pandemic. Interested in talking reaching out to the Iranians. They started to hold maritime security talks, not coincidentally, after they started to have tankers and oil sites bombed, targeted by the Iranians over the summer, last summer, when the Iranians decided that they would exact a toll for the Trump administration's maximum pressure policy, and some of these of Iran's neighbors in the Arab Gulf kind of look turned around and said, huh, yeah, we like the idea of Iran being contained. We don't like Iran, but this is your escalation. You us. Your escalation with Iran is starting to literally hit home and and that's not okay, because we don't want an implosion in Iran on our border. This is not a strategic way to deal with the Iran problem. So they started to reach out on their own. And so we started to see some de escalation there. And with the pandemic, I think the ambassador mentioned this, that we had a
Speaker 3 29:42
shipment from the Emiratis to the Iranians. We even had high level discussions that we have not seen between the Emiratis and the Iranians. So that's potentially good news. We've also seen de escalation potential in Yemen the Emirates were already signaling an interest in winding that war down. We've seen an interest in a ceasefire from the Saudis. Covid could potentially accelerate those trends, in the sense that there's less capacity potentially to engage in these kinds of conflicts with this pandemic and oil crisis raging at home. The final, I think, shift, which is, I think, one of the more interesting spaces to watch, and relates to the first de escalation. But could have other impacts as well, which is the changing nature of the Arab Gulf. The the oil crisis and the pandemic is could potentially really change these societies for a long time, for at least the past decade, if not longer, these smaller Gulf states, Saudi Arabia the largest among them, but the smaller Gulf States really have been asserting their power in a way disproportionate to what you would expect given their size and capacity. And so one could argue, or it's something to look at whether their political clout will diminish as the expats leave their countries, as they're not able to host these broad international summits, so they Emirates had to cancel the expo in this fall. They were expecting 25 million visitors. They're going to have they're having a flight of their of their expat workers from South Asia, some of this could be a very good thing because it can accelerate some of the diversification that they've been aiming for in terms of their own domestic reforms. So I'm not saying it's a particularly bad thing. We don't want people to lose jobs, of course, but it might not be such a bad thing to kind of recalibrate the weight of the Arab Gulf in the region, and if it does serve to restrain some of their more assertive activities we've seen in recent years in Libya and Yemen in particular, which have been really fueling extremely devastating wars, if they kind of turn and focus back home to some of these accountability issues we were discussing earlier, that could be a very good thing. So I think I'll just end on that more positive note, and I look forward to hearing from others. Thank you.
Speaker 1 32:08
Thanks for the positivity at the end and some interesting points about the so called soft power of the Gulf, because you don't hear it very often, actually, in these discussions. So let's turn it over to Dr Aaron for his comments. And then we've already been getting some questions online. Questions online, so feel free to as you're watching anything. Anything comes to mind, send it in via our Q and A format and dub, and I will kind of corral these and direct it back at the panel.
Speaker 4 32:37
I want to thank UCLA for including me in this panel. It's great to be here. Dalia said it was hard to follow an excellent first presentation. So I guess I'm left with the saying that everything was said, but not everyone said it. So I'll try to, despite the challenge, try to offer another, some other perspectives. So start by saying some maybe in general terms. I agree completely with Dalia. This is too early, I think, to offer a serious analysis of where we're heading. For a number of reasons. We know from massive other massive pandemics that were over in human history, like the Black Death in the 14th century, that some of the effects rolled over for decades, reformation, which occurred 100 years later. Some of its sources are founded in the pandemic. I think there's especially acute in the Middle East. Is over 60% of the population is younger than 30. And so the generational effect on the people who will be challenged by this will unfold for many years. I think the second general observation is that we cannot talk about a general trend in the region. If you look at the data, even of the illness. It varies in different countries. Initially, it was the non Arab actors that took the most hit Iran at some point. Half the cases of the region at some point were at Iran, Turkey, Israel, and in terms of power relations, you could say the United States. So the same paradigm we saw in in power projection, which was with a lot of non Arab actors, replicated itself in the illness, at least at some point. And the last general comment is that this coincided with this massive crisis of oil. Dahlia mentioned that the oil war, but also the dramatic decline in demand, which will, of course, puts extra pressure on the limited resources. I want to offer three so having with all these qualifications, I think there are three perspectives I propose to look at the how this crisis will unfold. First of all, the old theme that middle eastern scholars and political scientists are looking at, that's the state the. Arab and the non Arab state. It's an old tension between pan Arabism in the state, state capacity, and so it's fascinating to look how the state as an apparatus survive this. It is, of course, a massive challenge to state capacity, but not perhaps, in the traditional senses of the coercion power and military, but rather on other aspects of statism, such as the ability to deliver public health testing and even accurate information. And so I think, in a way, for scholars who study the region, or any educated person who is looking at it, we are now offered a broader analytical tool to look at the role of the state that, of course, occurs in a broader global context. The ambassador already introduced this. We are at the moment, I think that globalization is going back, and the state as a social institution is strengthening production. We will be moving back and so on. And so the we have to review or analyze how states are dealing with this challenge, or how they're benefiting from this global environment. It's going to be more conducive, I think, for traditional state capacity. Within the state capacity discussion, Middle Eastern scholars look a lot at securitization security forces, the combination of technological abilities and repressive regimes led to further a measures to control, to offer social control, even in countries that are more democratic, like Israel, in which suddenly, it turns out, Internal Security Services are now following through the cell phones citizens and whoever they interacted with weeks earlier. And so in the short term, I think the state as an institution is obviously getting stronger. There's a rallying around the flag. It's the only institution that can maybe offer help. But in the long term, there are significant challenges. The economic crisis is going to affect the global economic crisis. The decline in demand for oil and the pressures and resources demand needed for the health care will present more economic challenges. And of course, resources, economic resources, a fundamental tool of the state to deal with these challenges. It does offer a potential, even in the long term, strengthening if the economy will further shudder, as we saw in many states, the solution is greater state involvement in the economy. I think two countries are interesting, in particular Lebanon and Iraq. We saw a civil society response towards the state, with demonstrations with new martyrs against the state. This was somewhat halted with the crisis, but would be very interesting to see how it rules. So one perspective is the state, the second perspective is the role of great powers. One lens we have traditionally using, at least in political science, to look at the region, is the role of external powers. We were already in a process of an American withdrawal of sorts, especially under the current administration that's less committed to global leadership. But we do not still have another global competitor, ALA, the Cold War. But I agree with Dalia, we are bound to see an American Chinese competition. There were already early signs of that China, as Alia mentioned, was very eager to show it's dealing more effectively with the disease and the American incentive. There's a short term political incentive for the current administration to paint China as the villain in the story, and we already saw American efforts, including a visit of Secretary Pompeo last week in Israel, to push the government to disengage from some infrastructure projects with China. So it's a funding moment in which one great power is in decline, the other one is not there. Yet. There's early signs of competition, which may be drastically affected by a new administration come the election for January 2021 I think one structural opportunity here is for regional actors to cooperate more, if the great powers are not as dominant, maybe the Sunni Alliance, the Israeli Sunni relationship, will have an even greater opening, although I should caution, as Dalia said, perhaps some of the Gulf states would prefer bandwagoning against Iran, ie joining Iran rather than confronting it. So we have the state. We have great powers. And I think the third lens is, of course, conflicts in the region. The short outlook. I think for a short time, the crisis froze some of the conflicts because of the resources that had to be allocated or the concern about the conflict. There was definitely an opportunity to cooperate. We saw countries. Providing some assistance. Even in our own small corner of ISRAEL PALESTINE, there was much greater cooperation, not directly, even simply on health, but on secondary issues. Like Israel, in an unprecedented way, allowed Palestinian laborers to remain in territorial Israel for the length of the crisis. We saw flights of the first ever flight of it had a gulf airline into Israel, and some flights from Israel to Sudan, which no one took responsibility for. But now we can see that something is happening. However, I have to join the pessimistic line. We while it froze and while there were opportunities, conflicts are still rolling. There's a growing tension on the Iranian front, not only us, Iran, but also Israel, Iran, the dual cyber attacks, as well as signaling from Hezbollah that it may take a more active role. The last few weeks, it indicated, including on actions on the ground that it's ready to be more aggressive to deal with Israeli attacks. In Lebanon, for example, in a surprising incident, Hezbollah cut three places in the fence between Israel and Lebanon, indicating that if it wanted, it could go through the holes it created. And then they're already so these are think of the three lens lenses, state, great powers, conflict. There were two questions about ISRAEL PALESTINE. Would that be an appropriate moment to address them?
Speaker 5 41:31
We'll come to the questions in a moment. So, but please if you have some concluding remarks.
Speaker 4 41:40
So I think the conclusion is, in the first few weeks of this shock, there was a there was an opening for a shift, I think in the consciousness. I actually thought it reminded me a bit of the last days of the first Gulf War, when suddenly American dominance in Iraq changed the minds of people in the Middle East. So there was an option for that, but I think the stronger trends that were highlighted in my colleagues comments and in mind are stronger than this potential, not fully used opportunity, change, regional consciousness.
Speaker 5 42:18
Well, thank you. I want to thank all of our panelists, Ambassador Youssef, Dr dass K and Dr Iran, that was really fascinating. Overviews of the impact of this pandemic on the region. I think all three of you really made the necessary caveat that, of course, we're still in early days of seeing the impact of this pandemic, and in fact, its implications will continue to affect the region for many, many years to come. And so while this discussion that we're having today is just a very, very early and initial look at what will be, what will continue to have a massive and long term, potentially transformative impact upon the region, I think the other thing that all three of you agreed upon was the way in which the pandemic reinforces existing trends, exacerbates existing conflicts, rather than really fundamentally changing the trajectory of the region's politics and economics or humanitarian affairs. And in fact, it's worsened it and so unfortunately, what was already a fairly dire situation, politically, economically and in humanitarian terms across the region, in the region at large, has only been made worse by the pandemic. And as I think was pointed out, the worst may still may be yet to come. So this is something of a depressing conversation about the Middle East. But then again, most many discussions about Middle East politics tend to be somewhat depressing. So I suppose that's the that's the drawback of our business. Let me now we've been receiving questions, and I want to encourage the audience out there who are joining us from all around the world to continue to send in these questions. And I will, along with Kevin, try to pose as many as we can to to our panelists. I'll begin with just throwing out a couple of questions that that have concerned you know, really focused on on points that were raised, but maybe to get into a bit more detail on on some of these points. So one of the questions that have come up has been concerning the the effect that the precipitous decline in oil prices has had. You've mentioned that this is, this is kind of compounded, in a way, the the economic impact of the covid 19 and the geo strategic impact of this. But perhaps you could, you might want to elaborate, and in many ways, all three of you, I, I would say, for the Arab world, clearly, is it going to um? Um accelerate the desire and the attempt to diversify their economies away from being rentier economies based upon oil revenue. For Israel, on the other hand, high oil prices gave Israel an opportunity to export natural gas and to increase and to potentially gain great amount of wealth and in more regional influence through its natural gas imports. Does the decline in oil prices, and this is particularly for Dr Iran, will that impact Israel's ability to export natural gas? And what does, what does the declining oil prices mean for regional relations, particularly the relationship between or the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. So that's one question, the other series of questions that have come in. And I'm going to add to this a little bit concern something that hasn't been mentioned as yet, but is looming on the political horizon, and that is Israel's potential annexation of parts of the West Bank. So the question here and again, feel free and any of you to respond to this, does the likely annexation of parts of the West Bank maybe starting as early as July, maybe particularly for Ambassador Youssef. There's been a report in the Israeli pro Netanyahu newspaper Israel Hayam today, which said that Jordan, the Saudis, the UAE and others, will not oppose annexation, or they may do so publicly, but they're not really going to take any steps to really do anything about it. Does the impact of the pandemic make it more or less likely for Arab states to take strong actions in response to annexation of the West Bank. In other words, are they now in a weaker position, worried about their domestic populations and therefore more responsive to public opinion and maybe more willing to take steps to counter annexation of the West Bank, or are they more nervous and therefore less likely to do anything similarly on the question of annexation, the Palestinian Authority has just in response to the threat of annexation. The PLO has ended, formally announced it's ending its agreements with Israel, in particular, security cooperation with Israel. Is that going to undermine the Palestinian Authority's ability to respond to the coronavirus pandemic does? What is the connection between these agreements with Israel, cooperation with Israel, and the pa's ability to respond to the coronavirus pandemic, and finally, on the impact of annexation for terrorist organizations operating in the region, is it likely to increase their willingness to carry out attacks, both within the region and further afield in Western countries? So there's a lot of questions feel free to answer. You know, whatever most interests you in those questions, perhaps we'll start with Ambassador Youssef, and again, we'll work around the three panelists in same order.
Speaker 2 48:11
Thank you very much. Let me, let me try to respond to the question in relation to annexation. I think the in this issue is a make or break in relation to how the possibility of establishing a two state solution, and there are many who believe that this would be the last nail in the coffin of the two states. So this is why the response in relation to this issue will be huge. Of course, different countries are dealing with this issue in different ways. The Palestinians have announced that they will stop coordination and so on. And Jordan, the King of Jordan, indicated very clearly that this will put Israel and Jordan on a confrontation path, because Jordan would be the one that would be most affected by by this development, because of the annexation of the Jordan Valley in particular, but because of the situation in relation to the two state solution. And I think the message has reached Israel quite clearly, that this will have a huge impact. But unfortunately, Israel is dealing with this issue in accordance to its internal situation, and the situation regarding the premise in Netanyahu and how he's going to deal with his child and so on. So will it? Will it result in more extremism? Absolutely, because, because because the argument that those who have been advocating for peace for the last 20 something years have been saying, No, we will reach the two state solution. We will achieve peace and so on. So now even those who have been advocating for for peace for for decades are saying we failed and we don't have a solution. And. And and so, so it will become difficult. So this gives, of course, ammunition for all those who are arguing for using violence, using that peace didn't work. So we will see how things develop. Jordan also is saying that this is a violation of the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, because Israel and Jordan, when they had their agreement, the borders were not delineated between the West Bank and Jordan. Now, if Israel annexes this land and considers it part of its land, Jordan will never delineate borders between the West Bank and Jordan. So so we will see escalation, of course, at the same time, there are countries in the region that do not want to anger the United States at this point in time, and they are anticipating to see, waiting to see what the outcome of the elections would be, and so on. So this will be a situation where I expect escalation for the few weeks and months to
Speaker 3 51:06
come. Yes, yes, okay, yeah, well, I guess I'll start with annexation, just to follow up on that, I think that pandemic is probably less of a factor than the than the US factor and the enabling environment that the US has created through the Trump plan, which could be read as an annexation plan of sorts itself. So what's interesting is that to the extent that we're going to see any constraints on Netanyahu for annexation, I would think they would come from within Israel itself, particularly its defense establishment. We've had seeing just this week, major figures in Israel, Ehud, I'm sure will elaborate, because of the Jordan factor and other national security considerations, vehemently arguing against annexation as a real threat to Israel's security. But I think the dilemma with the broader Arab world is that, and this is one of those arguments of you know, these were trends that were there before the pandemic. Unfortunately, the Palestinian conflict is not really on the radar in the region anymore. When you have civil wars of the magnitude of Syria and Yemen and even Libya, it is the Palestinian conflict is not looking like the front and center burning issue now, of course, emotionally it still resonates in the region among Arab publics, of course, but these Gulf leaders have made it very clear they've charted a different direction, and they are not really paying a cost for it. Again, they have this quite enabling environment. The dilemma though, of course, is that Israel could make peace with these Arab states. The problem is, it's not really at war with the Arab world anymore. It's been a long time since the Israel has faced a real threat. For many surrounding Arab states, actually, relations with Egypt are closer than ever. The Gulf state normalization phenomenon has been ongoing. It's no big surprise, even though every day it seems to be a new headline acting as if this is some big, you know, momentous event. It's really not big news. So it's not earth shattering for Israel even to make peace with it's certainly important symbolically to Israelis, they want to be accepted in the region. But it's not earth shattering because Israel isn't at war with Saudi Arabia. It's at war with Hezbollah. It's at war with Iran. These are the conflicts that need to be solved, and ultimately, the Palestinians and Israelis live on one piece of land so they can make all the peace they want with the Arab world, but ultimately, that's not going to resolve the conflict that's right next door and within their country, especially if they annex so I agree with the ambassador. I think the trajectory is not looking good. The two state solution wasn't looking very viable before the pandemic, and with not Tanya who capitalizing on the pandemic in the election, consolidating this coalition that was probably unthinkable before that Benny Gantz would succumb to the conditions he did, really is making the two state solution looking like it's hanging on a thread more than it ever has been, and just briefly on the oil decline, I think I alluded to already, it's going to have an impact across the region, again, combined with the pandemic, not just in the oil rich states, but all those surrounding states, and in Jordan and Egypt and other economies where workers rely on the remittance they get from the oil Gulf economies. But what I think is a really, really interesting space to watch, as I said, is the social and political impact it will have within the Gulf states themselves. This rentier state model already wasn't looking sustainable. They were already trying to diversify economies because they knew they couldn't buy off. You know, domestic discontent forever. But now it's really, now it's an existential crisis and and they're going to have to have a different relationship with their population to survive, frankly. So I think that is going to be potentially not just an economic impact, but a political impact of what these states look like in the months and. Years to come on, Saudi Iran, I think that that there's other other factors that are kind of more more at play in terms of whether things ramp up or down. Unfortunately, you know, hopes that, you know, maybe the oil price plunge with a pandemic would lead, let's say, the Saudis to purchase less arms. They were the fifth largest arms purchaser in the world. Think they purchased over 60 billion just last year. So there could be hopes that, you know, scaling back at Arms purchases in the in the face of these other pressures would would maybe lead to this more de escalation with with Iran. And the Iranians face similar constraints. The problem is, these regional wars are not that costly to fuel if there's a desire to do so. So I think the real question is political. Where will Where do these leaders in this region want to take their countries and their people? Thank you, Dr Iran.
Speaker 4 55:53
Let me add to the annexation one angle, which I think goes beyond simply ISRAEL PALESTINE. That's the role of the EU, seen from the region, the EU is an important actor in support in moderating conflicts, moderating Israeli actions in the West Bank, supporting civil society, particularly in North Africa. And I think one side effect of the crisis is weakening of the European Union, and consequently its ability to serve as a moderating power over half of Israel's exports. It goes to the EU, and if there was a stronger EU that took a stronger position, calculations in Jerusalem would have been different. And this weakness, I'm afraid, is not limited only to moderating this conflict, but other aspects of the region, maybe looking for North America. We don't think about it that much, but in some corners, what the Europeans are doing is quite significant. I think the decision about the annexation specifically will be some internal negotiation, as Dalia mentioned, between the security establishment, the prime minister, who feels confident and desperate because of the trial, and in this discussion, the Arab position will play an important role for the security establishment. It's important to note that contrary to previous debates like the one we had between the security establishment and Prime Minister Netanyahu over Iran, we have a stronger set, weaker set of military and security leaders. The head of the Mossad is very close to Netanyahu. Probably won't challenge him, and so I'm not sure how much we can we can count on this as a moderating element. Another potential unexpected development is Israel hates to be in a situation it deals with two fronts, with this further escalation with Hezbollah in Iran, this may provide some freezing element to this intention to annex. The second issue was, what happens if Israel and the Palestinian Authority stop cooperating, and how would that affect humanitarian effect? I say a few things. I think. First of all, the PA is pretty much dependent on Israel as an institution, not again, not only directly in health issues, but economics, access to labor and so on. I should also note that Abu Mazen said this number of times about ending agreements, and I think we have to wait and see the statement he made recently is not enough. A third component is that the Israelis who are engaged in the West Bank, and I should also say Gaza, in the security establishment, think about it already in humanitarian terms. So there isn't a constant awareness that this is not only a conflictual political situation, but the situation that can end up is a humanitarian challenge directly to Israel, the PA collapses, and there's a humanitarian disaster. Is where we have to fend for it. It's maybe symbolic that the commanding officer of home command dealt with the military's response to Corona in Israel is going to be very soon the commanding officer of central command, which is the command responsible for the West Bank, so the same general that dealt with Corona and Israel is now going to be responsible for the West Bank. It's very moderate and smart general. So as much as we can pin our hopes on individuals, there's at least some hope there. The third question that dove raised was about energy. It should be noted that Israeli efforts to export energy to Europe especially were already although there were many statements, it faces significant difficulties. For example, it requires a massive pipeline, and we were not close to major exports. It will weaken Israel's potential leverage on Egypt and Jordan to countries it does export some gas to, and it will weaken early mechanisms of energy cooperation, especially the Egyptian led Mediterranean forum for gas, which was a early sign of an institutional regional arrangement around energy. Once energy becomes less important, or gas becomes less important and there'll be less. Incentive to develop this cooperation mechanism, and again, a non Corona virus development is the most important that's Turkey's assertiveness in the eastern Mediterranean and the challenges it posed to energy delivery and development, especially around Cyprus.
Speaker 5 1:00:22
Well, thank you for those, for that really interesting answers. We've got some more questions coming in, and I'm conscious of the fact that we don't have a great amount of time, so I'm going to just, again, pose a broad question that has come in in different ways, to all three of you. And then, and then we'll, we'll see how much time we have left. That's when we so far the picture that you painted, and I think it's an accurate picture as being a pretty bleak one, I think we could all say that, are there any examples of cooperation occurring, that are that we can see that brought in that in response to this pandemic, whether it's cooperation at the interstate level, where there was mention made of greater cooperation within the GCC, for example, but also cooperation societally, maybe between different sectors or of these domestic societies, are we seeing actors Come together? I mean, some of these countries have long been driven by internal divides, sectarian divides, for example, Lebanon is one that comes obviously to mind is the is the impact of this crisis, resulting or leading to some surprising amounts of cooperation or unity where there was previously division and discord, and this, again, feel free to bring in any specific country. We haven't talked to Ambassador Youssef here. You're obviously from Egypt. So I'm wondering, you know what we're seeing? How is this impacting Egypt, both domestically, but also Egypt's cooperation, for example, with Sudan or with Israel, with its with its neighbors.
Speaker 2 1:02:10
Well, unfortunately, what we have seen globally is that the response to the pandemic was national and not International. And what we have seen also globally, that country, we have competing for all kinds of medical equipment, even masks and so on. So this was the global attitude because of the shortage of medical supply and so on. So it wasn't there was little areas for for cooperation. But having said that, I also gave a number of examples where there was cooperation, including Gulf assistance to Iran, Israeli Palestinian cooperation and so on. So they were some bright spots. But the problem is that these price bright spots are not enough to make the necessary requirement for a transformation, for a new beginning, for, you know, I think Dalia was talking about some of the of the positive elements in relation to, you know, The silver lining that we may see, that may have a positive, you know, outcome, and so on. And I agree with that. But the problem that is this positive dimension in relation to the big picture that you refer to, and I think the three of us refer to, is rather minimal. So, yes, there has been cooperation, and I think cooperation will probably increase as the severity of the pandemic declines, but, but I don't think that we can, we can be optimistic and see, you know, light at the end of the tunnel in relation to number of elements pertaining to the situation and division as a result of the pandemic.
Speaker 3 1:04:06
Thank you. Talia, yeah. Not much to add. I agree. I think that I also the two examples I thought of were already mentioned. I think I even mentioned them myself as well, the UAE shipment to Iran, the dialog there that we have not seen again. I think most of this so far is tactical, not strategic, and that's what I think the ambassador is referring to. It's just not clear this can lead to a long term shift. The PA Israeli cooperation was interesting. Just Israel loaned $200 million to the PA to make up for tax revenue it lost in the virus, all well and good. You're seeing, you know, stories of Gaza garment makers shipping mass and protective gear to Israel, instead of graffiti being anti Israel on the walls you're seeing, you know, covid 19 graffiti. I mean, that's, you know. I guess progress. The problem is it only goes so far when you're dealing with the specter of Israel potentially annexing the West Bank, nearly the entire West Bank and the Jordan Valley, which will completely demolish any potential openings that might have existed. So I think that's the problem we're facing, is that they're interesting tactical shifts, but we're not seeing a change in the strategic directory. One last point we didn't raise, that I would just bring in here is, you know, and this does take political will, not just from the region, but from outside, working with the region, and probably won't be coming from the US right now, but, but it could. And along with other international partners, you're seeing a lot more talk and in security conferences and other venues of the need to establish a regional dialog, security dialog. And, you know, a pandemic could make more clear that the crises in the region cross geographic boundaries. Nobody wins in a pandemic. Nobody wins from maritime security being undermined through constant rock you know, attacks against tankers, everybody loses. And so there is a need. I've been arguing this for many years. Of the Egyptians, actually and historically, have been in the forefront of efforts to be interested in forging a regional dialog. We need to figure out a model. It will take time, but there needs to be an investment in some kind of form for all regional states, and it needs to be inclusive. It can't just be a form to counter Iran or a form to solve the Israel Palestinian conflict. That's how they've been done in the past. They didn't work. But we need some kind of form. The Middle East is the least institutionalized region of the world. It's the only region that doesn't have some open dialog of this nature. It's really time. So I, my hope is that this pandemic can be used as an opening to hopefully increase the appetite for that within the region. We don't see it yet, but, but maybe we'll get there, start to everyone.
Speaker 4 1:07:02
I think, as my two colleagues mentioned, we did see some signs of cooperation, highlighting again, that we can that there's some areas is Dalian mentioned that are easier to cooperate, rather than others. In terms internally, I can say a few words about Israel. The healthcare field is one of the only areas that are completely integrated in Israeli society. You know, while schooling is separate, for example, hospitals are generally completely joint, and the disproportionate number of Israeli Arabs, Israeli Palestinians, working in that sector. So I think in that respect, it did create an atmosphere of a goodwill and acceptance. Again, there's already a trajectory in this direction when Israeli Arabs are more integrated in some of the public spheres. For example, the chairman of Israel's second biggest bank that was initially created by the Zionist movement. Bank Louis is now an Israeli Palestinians. We also saw reaching across another divide, the internal Jewish divide between ultra orthodox and secular City was the most severely hit in terms of geography, and the IDF took it over. So these are two populations that don't mix, as you know, don't serve. And yet the military is an institution was able to reach out. There were openings for gestures, for Qasim, I think a big Palestinian city may assisted neighbor. And so these things, again, they take time. And I think these these gestures, at least on the internal arena, do make a difference on the long term. They do remind, and excuse me for being naive. They do remind our common humanity in these issues. I think it's not the last chapter and the two big developments that can change that, and that is the development of a vaccine or some technological breakthrough that will make testing much easier. So that depends who will be the first one to do it, but there's a lot of efforts in Israel to develop cheaper and quicker solutions for that. If this is somehow leveraged to a broader outreach, or perhaps a new American administration with a new polio type vaccine that is offered to the world can change this green picture we are painting now very limited cooperation.
Speaker 1 1:09:31
Let me ask one final question for our panelists. I think the discussion has been excellent so far, and I want to try to link the discussion of the the need to rethink the economic models in the region, coupled with, you know, the the ongoing and, in my opinion, temporarily suspended social unrest. You know, we know historically, that in times of emergency, whether in the region or, you know, even in the United States, when there's war or emergency. Uh, public contention goes down. Many people expect it will never pop up again. But when the emergency is ended, normalcy does not appear. Instead, you usually see a rise in claims on on political elites, new demands, possibly even new coalitions that were born during the emergency period. So it's probably not a crazy idea to predict that, either through the introduction of new forms of treatment, which at least make it easier to deal with the illness, or, you know, in this miracle vaccine, whenever it comes that when you know the post normal phase is introduced, a rise of different types of protest will occur, making both old and new demands. How will that be? How that might intersect with the need recognized, both by those in charge, as well as many others, for a new economic model, not one for the region, but country specific, given the decline in commodity prices, the lack of investment from West, from Western investors, and the possibility, but not promise, of funds coming from the east, to kind of reintegrate some parts of the region into the world economy. Is there a model that can satisfy not everyone, of course, but that we can rethink the region and the incorporation of so many individuals who, you know, have been demanding to be pulled into both social and economic context over the last decade. So what? And you know, what is individual countries, how could they think of reinserting themselves in the world economy, whether or not the geopolitical the geopolitics aside for the time being, yeah, Ambassador, please.
Speaker 2 1:11:45
Well, I think this is a crucial issue, because I think the impact on the economies in the region will be catastrophic, and it applies across the board, even those who have huge investments and funds in the Gulf are suffering hugely from from what has happened? Of course, the decline in the price of oil has had a huge impact, and I just saw a report this morning that expects that 2.5 million people will, will, will will have to leave the Gulf as a result of covid 19. So, so this will happen. So the decline will happen at the same time. I think a number of countries in the Gulf have been talking about diversification of the economy for years, but they haven't been as serious about it as they could. So I think that this, what happened in the pandemic, will result in a re thinking of the economies in the Gulf in a much more fundamental way, because they also realized that all these workers, just like they were helping in building the economy, they can become also a source of danger as a result of the virus. So this is part of it. But then there are a number of other countries in that will be dealing with all kinds of things. We were discussing earlier, the price of oil, for example, and how this would be a problem for the Gulf. But this is absolutely welcome to a country like Jordan, a country like Morocco that imports a large portion of its oil, so this will have a positive impact on their process of development. But then we come to another dimension, issues pertaining to okay, how long will it take to recover, and this is something that would be very difficult to to to calculate or to predict in in major sectors. So in a sector like tourism, for example, when will will Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, be able to recover some of of the tourists and so on. No one knows if we have not clear on when we will have planes flying in the air in the next few months. So and and also, people will start thinking about tourism in a totally different way. They will start thinking, Okay, do I want to be held in this place if there is a second wave or a third wave and so on investments in light of the current situation regarding investments and people going to much safer havens in relation to investment and so on. So countries will be forced to rethink their strategy across the board, whether they are rich countries, poor countries, middle income countries, they will have to do that. The problem is that the whole world is passing through this crisis at the same time. So when we had the 2008 2009 financial crisis, we still had China and India that were able to pull the word the global economy. We don't have anything like that this time. So now it is my. More difficult, and countries will have to work on it very hard. Otherwise, there will be another wave of revolutions, revolts, demonstrations, you name it, because people will be suffering a lot and as a result of poverty, loss of employment and so on.
Speaker 3 1:15:18
Doctor Jessica, yeah, I really can't add more that was so thorough, only to say that I think we absolutely can and should expect new waves, the original conditions that led to the protest across the region, and they do vary. I think that's an important point, but the grievances are, there are some commonalities. And I think that now there'll be, you know, the pandemic lays bare the real weaknesses of these societies, these governments and their state capacities to handle people's needs, and really underscores the inequities even in Gulf oil rich countries and and so I think, but certainly in countries like Egypt, Jordan Lebanon is in particularly dire condition. So I think we can expect protest and pressures. The question is, what will the response be when we saw the initial wave of protest in the Arab uprisings? You know, there are two tactics, repression, or CO option. And in the in the past, the oil rich stage, could Co Op, they could afford to co op. That option is likely off the agenda. Now, I think the age of the rent your state, indefinite age of the is done. So. Is it going to just be a playbook of doubling down on repressive tactics and squashing any opposition, or is there going to be openings or new contracts with between state and society of maybe, you know you're willing to put up with a certain level of political repression if you're opening up the societal space that looks like what Saudi Arabia is right now, aiming for. Hard to know if that's going to be a bargain that's sustainable, but it will mean that people live very differently, even in these states that were that were well subsidized in the past, those those cuts will be there. People will get taxed who have not been taxed before, they will not be able to live the kinds of lives they led before. The oil money will not be flowing to the rest of the region. So I think, you know, it's, it's, it's a very, very important question, but one of those that I think we're going to have to watch for a while to really understand how it's going to play out.
Unknown Speaker 1:17:33
Dr Aaron, final word for you,
Speaker 4 1:17:35
yes, thank you. It will be a strange moment to try and get into integrate to the global economy is we are witnessing a reversal of globalization, and perhaps going back to state centered economic models. It will create, I think, an opening for China to invest in economically challenged areas, as we've seen their investments in Africa, which will lead to more discussions about Chinese control of infrastructure. Diversification is difficult because part of it, at least in Saudi Arabia, include required massive investments like this new city, Neo or moving to high tech. And if the cost of oil is dropping, so much, will be difficult for MBs to try and pursue these initiatives. If I'm trying to think outside of the box, what are the opportunities? Healthcare is going to be a huge industry in the wealthier parts of the world. It's very expensive in places like North America, and the ability to deliver telemedicine will offer opportunities for countries that have good training in their medical sector to provide richer countries via technology like the one we're using now, healthcare also requires a lot of laborers that have limited skills, like support stuff and so On, which may create some demand for less skilled public but include, for example, some of the Middle Eastern immigrants in Europe can find themselves in these sectors, but that will require a innovation, thinking outside of the box, reconnecting to some global networks of healthcare. And I think the picture we described here is not very promising about it, but the opportunity, I think, is there.
Speaker 1 1:19:27
Well, thank you all. And if you've been watching, I want you to know that you were not alone. Our live audience just on Zoom alone, was in the triple digits, many more on YouTube. So arguably, a more successful panel than even could be held in person in some place, in some cases, at UCLA. On behalf of UCLA International Institute, I'd like to thank everyone for participating and watching, and my thanks to Doug Waxman for CO moderating this panel, and I hope that we're able to continue this conversation in this forum or other for in the future. Sure, because, as all of us have established, this is the beginning of this process, and I think keeping an eye on it and keeping these conversations going is very important. Thanks so much, and we appreciate you watching and participating.
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